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Abstract
Reinforcement learning algorithms describe how an agent can learn
an optimal action policy in a sequential decision process, through re-
peated experience. In a given environment, the agent policy provides
him some running and terminal rewards. As in online learning, the
agent learns sequentially. As in multi-armed bandit problems, when
an agent picks an action, he can not infer ex-post the rewards induced
by other action choices. In reinforcement learning, his actions have
consequences: they influence not only rewards, but also future states
of the world. The goal of reinforcement learning is to find an optimal
policy – a mapping from the states of the world to the set of actions, in
order to maximize cumulative reward, which is a long term strategy.
Exploring might be sub-optimal on a short-term horizon but could
lead to optimal long-term ones. Many problems of optimal control,
popular in economics for more than forty years, can be expressed in
the reinforcement learning framework, and recent advances in compu-
tational science, provided in particular by deep learning algorithms,
can be used by economists in order to solve complex behavioral prob-
lems. In this article, we propose a state-of-the-art of reinforcement
learning techniques, and present applications in economics, game the-
ory, operation research and finance.
JEL: C18; C41; C44; C54; C57; C61; C63; C68; C70; C90; D40; D70; D83
Keywords: causality; control; machine learning; Markov decision process;
multi-armed bandits; online-learning; Q-learning; regret; reinforcement learn-
ing; rewards; sequential learning
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1 Introduction
1.1 An Historical Overview
Reinforcement learning is related to the study of how agents, animals, au-
tonomous robots use experience to adapt their behavior in order to maximize
some rewards. It differs from other types of learning (such as unsupervized
or supervised) since the learning follows from feedback and experience (and
not from some fixed training sample of data). Thorndike (1911) or Skinner
(1938) used reinforcement learning in the context of behavioral psychology,
ethology and biology. For instance, Thorndike (1911) studied learning be-
havior in cats, with some popular experiences, using some ‘puzzle box’ that
can be opened (from the inside) via various mechanisms (with latches and
strings) to obtain some food that was outside the box. Edward Thorndike
observed that cats usually began experimenting – by pressing levers, pulling
cords, pawing, etc. – to escape, and over time, cats will learn how particular
actions, repeated in a given order, could lead to the outcome (here some
food). To be more specific, it was necessary for cats to explore alternative
actions in order to escape the puzzle box. Over time, cats did explore less,
and start to exploit experience, and repeat successful actions to escape faster.
And the cat needed enough time to explore all techniques, since some could
possibly lead more quickly – or with less effort – to the escape. Thorndike
(1911) proved that there was a balance between exploration and exploitation.
This issue could remind us of the simulated annealing in optimization, where
a classical optimization routine is pursued, and we allow to move randomly
to another point (which would be the exploration part) and start over (the
exploitation part). Such a procedure reinforces the chances of converging
towards a global optimum, instead of converging to a more local one.
Another issue was that a multi-action sequence was necessary to escape,
and therefore, when the cat was able to escape at the first time it was difficult
to assign which action actually caused the escape. An action taken at the
beginning (such as pulling a string) might have an impact some time later,
after other actions are performed. This is usually called a credit assignment
problem, as in Minsky (1961). Skinner (1938) refined the puzzle box experi-
ment, and introduced the concept of operant conditioning (see Jenkins (1979)
or Garcia (1981) for an overview). The idea was to modify a part, such as
a lever, such that at some points in time pressing the lever will provide a
positive reward (such as food) or a negative one (i.e. a punishment, such as
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electric shocks). The goal of those experiments was to understand how past
voluntary actions modify future ones. Those experiments were performed on
rats, and no longer cats. Tolman (1948) used similar experiments (includ-
ing also mazes) to prove that the classical approach, based on chaining of
stimulus-responses, was maybe not the good one to model animal (and men)
behaviors. A pure stimulus-responses learning could not be used by rats to
escape a maze, when experimenters start to block roads with obstacles. He
introduced the idea of cognitive maps of the maze that allow for more flexi-
bility. All those techniques could be related to the ones used in reinforcement
learning.
Reinforcement learning is about understanding how agents might learn to
make optimal decisions through repeated experience, as discussed in Sutton
and Barto (1981). More formally, agents (animals, humans or machines)
strive to maximize some long-term reward, that is the cumulated discounted
sum of future rewards, as in classical economic models. Even if animals can
be seen as have a short-term horizon, they do understand that a punishment
followed by a large reward can be better than two small rewards, as explained
in Rescorla (1979), that introduced the concept of second-order conditioning.
A technical assumption, that could be seen as relevant in many human and
animal behaviors, is that the dynamics satisfies some Markov property, and
in this article we will focus only on Markov decision processes. Reinforcement
learning is about solving the credit assignment problem by matching actions,
states of the world and rewards.
As we will see in the next section, formally, at time t, the agent at state
of the world st ∈ S makes an action at ∈ A, obtains a reward rt ∈ R and
the state of the world becomes st+1 ∈ S. A policy is a mapping from S to
A, and the goal is to learn from past data (past actions, past rewards) how
to find an optimal policy. A popular application of reinforcement learning
algorithms is in games, such as playing chess or Go, as discussed in Silver et al.
(2018), or Igami (2017) which provides economic interpretation of several
algorithms used on games (Deep Blue for chess or AlphaGo for Go) based
on structural estimation and machine (reinforcement) learning. More simply,
Russell and Norvig (2009) introduced a grid world to explain heuristics about
reinforcement learning, see Figure 1. Positions on the 4×3 grid are the states
S, and actions A are movements allowed. The optimal policy pi : S → A
is here computed using sequential machine learning techniques that we will
describe in this article.
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Figure 1: Sequential decision making problem on a 4×3 grid (S states), from
Russell and Norvig (2009). The agent starts at the state (A,1), and moves
around the environment, trying to reach terminal state (D,3) to get a +1
reward - and to avoid terminal state (D,2) where a -1 reward (punishment) is
given. Possible actions (A) are given on the top-right figure. On the bottom,
two policies are given with pi : S → A on the left, and pi : S → A ⊂ A on
the right. In the later case, there can be random selection of actions in some
states, for instance pi((A,1)) ∈ {up, right}.
1.2 From Machine to Reinforcement Learning
Supervised Machine Learning techniques is a static problem: given a dataset
Dn = {(yi, xi)}, the goal is to learn a mapping m̂n between x and y. In
decision theory m̂n typically takes values in a binary space, which could be
to accept or reject a mortgage in credit risk models, or to invest or not in
some specific asset. m̂n can also take values in the real line, and denote an
amount of money to save, a quantity to purchase or a price to ask. Online
learning is based on the assumption that (yi, xi) arrive in a sequential order,
and the focus is on the evolution of m̂n as n growth, updating the training
dataset from Dn−1 to Dn. Reinforcement learning incorporates the idea that
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at time n−1, a choice was made, that will influence (yn, xn), and the standard
i.i.d. assumption of the dataset is no longer valid. Reinforcement learning is
related to sequential decision making and control.
Consider an online shop, where the retailer tries to maximize profit by
sequentially suggesting products to consumers. Consumers are characterized
by some features, such as their age, or their gender, as well as information
about what’s in their shopping cart. The consumer and the shop will have
sequential interactions. Each round, the consumer can either add a prod-
uct to the shopping cart, or not buy a product and continue shopping, or
finally stop shopping and check out. Those transitions are characterized by
transition probabilities, function of past states and actions. Such transition
probability function is unknown and must be learned by the shop. Should
the retailer display the most profitable products, exploiting information he
obtained previously, or explore actions, that could be less profitable, but
might provide relevant information ?
The induced problems are related to the fact that acting has consequences,
possibly delayed. It is about learning to sacrifice small immediate rewards in
order to gain larger long-term ones. If standard Machine Learning is about
learning from given data, reinforcement learning is about active experimen-
tation. Actions can be seen as an intervention, so there are strong connec-
tions between reinforcement learning and causality modeling. Reinforcement
learning allows us to infer consequences of interventions (or actions) used in
the past. Pearl (2019) asked the simple economic question ‘what will happen
if we double the price’ (of an item we try to sell)? ‘Such questions cannot be
answered from sales data alone, because they involve a change in customers
behaviour, in reaction to the new pricing’. Reinforcement learning is related
to such problem: inferring the impact of interventions. And the fact that
intervention will impact the environment, mentioned by Pearl (2019), is pre-
cisely what reinforcement learning is about. So this theory, central in decision
science will appear naturally in sequential experimentation, optimization, de-
cision theory, game theory, auction design, etc. As we will see in the article
(and as already mentioned in the previous section), models in sequential de-
cision making as long history in economics, even if rarely mentioned in the
computational science literature. Most of the articles published in economic
journal mentioned that such problems were computationally difficult to solve.
Nevertheless, we will try to show that recent advances are extremely promis-
ing, and it is now to possible to model more and more complex economic
problems.
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1.3 Agenda
In section 2, we will explain connections between reinforcement learning and
various related topics. We will start with machine learning principles, defin-
ing standard tools that will be extended later one (with the loss function, the
risk of an estimator and regret minimization), in section 2.1. In section 2.2,
we introduce dynamical problems with online learning, where we exploit past
information sequentially. In section 2.3, we present briefly the multi-armed
bandit problem, where choices are made, at each period of time, and those
have consequences on the information we obtain. And finally, in section 2.4
we start formalizing reinforcement learning models, and give a general frame-
work. In those sections, we mainly explain the connections between various
learning terms used in the literature.
Then, we present various problems tackled in the literature, in section
3. We will start with some general mathematical properties, giving various
interpretations of the optimization problem, in section 3.1. Finally, we will
conclude, in section 3.4, with a presentation of a classical related problem,
called inverse reinforcement learning, where we try to use observed decisions
in order to infer various quantities, such as the reward or the policy function.
Finally, three sections are presenting applications of reinforcement learn-
ing. In section 4.1, we discuss applications in economic modeling, starting
with the classical consumption and income dynamics, which is a classical
optimal control problem in economics. We then discuss bounded rationality
and strong connections with reinforcement learning. Then we will see, start-
ing from Jovanovic (1982), that reinforcement learning can be used to model
single firm dynamics. And finally, we present connections with adaptative
design for experiments, inspired by Weber (1992) (and multi-armed bandits).
In section 4.2, we discuss applications of reinforcement learning in oper-
ation research, such as the traveling salesman, where the standard dilemma
exploration/exploitation can be used to converge faster to (near) optimal
solutions. Then we discuss stochastic games and equilibrium, as well as
mean-field games, and auctions and real-time bidding. Finally, we will ex-
tend the single firm approach of the previous section to the case of oligopoly
and dynamic games.
Finally, in section 4.3, we detail applications in finance. We start with
risk management, valuation and hedging of financial derivatives problems on
then focus on portfolio allocation issues. At last, we present a very natural
framework for such algorithms: market impact and market making.
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2 From Machine to Reinforcement Learning
Machine learning methods generally make decision based on known proper-
ties learned from the training data, using many principles and tools from
statistics. However machine learning models aspire to find generalized pre-
dictive pattern. Most learning problems could be seen as an optimization of
a cost: minimizing a loss or maximizing a reward. But learning algorithms
seek to optimize a criterion (loss, reward, regret) on training and unseen
samples.
2.1 Machine Learning principles
Machine learning has so many branches (supervised vs unsupervised learning,
online or not,...) that it is not always easy to identify the label associated to a
given real world problem. Therefore, seeing machine learning as a set of data
and an optimization criterion is often helpful. To introduce Reinforcement
Learning (RL), we propose here a regret approach, which ties machine learn-
ing, online aggregation, bandits and, more generally, reinforcement learning.
In order to introduce most of machine learning terminology and schemes,
we detail a class of models: supervised learning. In this class of models, one
variable is the variable of interest, denoted y and usually called the endo-
geneous variable in econometrics. To do so, consider some learning sample
Dn = {(y1, x1), ..., (yn, xn)} seen as realization of n i.i.d. random variables
(Y,X). We wish to map the dataset Dn into a model from the (supposed)
statistical relations between xi and yi that are relevant to a task. Note that
in the context of sequential data we will prefer the generic notation (yt, xt).
The goal, when learning, is to find a function f ∈ F from the input space
X into the action space A: f : X 7→ A. Thus, f(x|Dn) is the action at some
point x. An action could be a prediction (for example what temperature
will it be tomorrow? Is there a cat on this image?) or a decision (a chess
move, go move...). Note that in a standard regression problem A is the same
as Y , but not necessary in a classification problem: in a logistic regression,
Y = {0, 1} but actions can be probabilities A ∈ [0, 1].
The decision function f is all the better as its actions f(x) are good when
confronted to the unseen corresponding output y from Y . The loss function
(or cost) measures the relevance of these actions when f(x) is taken and y
has occurred: ` : A× Y 7→ R+.
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The risk is the expectation of the loss:
R(f) = E[`(f(X), Y )]
Thus formalized, the learning could be seen as an optimization problem. We
wish to find a function f ∗ ∈ F which minimizes the cost:
R(f ∗) = inf
f∈F
{R(f)}
If such a function f ∗ exists and is unique it is called oracle or target.
In most applications we do not know the distribution of the data. How-
ever, given a training set Dn = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}, we use the empirical
distribution of the training data and define
R̂n(f) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
`(f(xi), yi).
Thus, we minimize this empirical risk while trying to avoid over-fitting and
keeping in mind that the real objective is to minimize R(f), i.e. the average
loss computed on any new observation. The main difficulty is that the target
function is only defined at the training points.
Furthermore, we need to restrain the class of target functions or loss
function class. Indeed, It would be impossible to reach sub-linear regret: if
the loss is bounded 0 ≤ ` ≤ K then Rn ≤ Kn, hopefully Rn  n
One way to evaluate the learning performance is to compute regret. Re-
gret is defined as the difference between the actual risk, and the optimal
oracle risk,
R = R(f)−R(f ∗)
= R(f)− inf
f∈F
{R(f)}
= E
[
`(f(X), Y )
]− E[`(f ∗(X), Y )].
In supervised learning, we prefer the name of excess risk, or excess loss.
This notion of regret is particularly relevant in sequential learning, where
your action at t depends on previous ones on t − 1, t − 2, ... . In online (or
sequential) learning, the regret is measured by the cumulative loss it suffers
along its run on a sequence of examples. We could see it as the excess loss
for not consistently predicting with the optimal model.
RT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ft(xt), yt)− inf
f∈F
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(f(xt), yt)
}
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where the first term is the estimation error between the target and the predic-
tion, and the second is the approximation error. Bandits and Reinforcement
Learning deal with maximizing a reward, instead of minimizing a loss. Thus,
we can re-write regret as the difference between the reward that could have
been achieved and what was actually achieved according to a sequence of
actions,
RT = max
a
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
r(a)
}
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
r(at)
Thus, minimizing a loss or maximizing a reward is the same optimization
problem as minimizing the regret, as defined in Robbins (1952).
For instance, in the ordinary least squares regression, A = Y = R, and
we use the squared loss: ` : (a, y) 7→ (a−y)2. In that case, the mean squared
risk is R(f) = E [(f(X)− Y )2] while the target is f ∗(X) = E [Y |X]. In
the case of classification, where y is a variable in K categories, A can be a
selection of a class, so A = Y = {1, . . . , K}. The classical loss in that case is
the missclassification dummy loss `(a, y) = 1a6=y, and the associated risk is
the misspecification probability, R(f) = E [1f(X)6=Y ] = P(f(X) 6= Y ), while
the target: is f ∗(X) = argmax
1≤k≤K
{P(Y = k|X)}.
To go further, Mullainathan and Spiess (2017), Charpentier et al. (2018)
or Athey and Imbens (2019) recently discussed connections between econo-
metrics and machine learning, and possible applications of machine learning
techniques in econometrics.
2.2 Online learning
In classical (or batch) learning described previously, we want to build an
estimator f̂ from Dn = {(xi, yi)} such as the regret E[R(f̂)]− inff∈F{R(f)}
is as small as possible. However, in the online learning framework, we get the
data through a sequential process and the training set is changing at each
iteration. Here, observations are not i.i.d, and not necessarily random.
Following Bottou (1998), assume that data become available at a sequen-
tial order, and the goal is to update our previous predictor with the new
observation. To emphasize the dynamic procedure, let t denote the number
of available observation (instead of n, in order to emphasize the sequential as-
pect of the problem). Formally, from our sample Dt = {(y1, x1), · · · , (yt, xt)}
we can derive a model f(x|Dt), denoted ft. The goal in online learning is to
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compute an update ft+1 of ft using the new observation (yt+1, xt+1).
At step t, the learner gets xt ∈ X and predicts ŷt ∈ Y , exploiting past
information Dt−1. Then, the real observation yt is revealed and generates a
loss `(ŷt, yt). Thus, ŷt is a function of (xt, (xi, yi)i=1...t−1).
Consider the case of forecasting with expert advice: expert aggregation.
Here, K models can be used, in a supervised context, on the same objective
variable y, f̂1(x|Dt), . . . , f̂K(x|Dt). Quite naturally, it is possible a linear
combination (or a weighted average) of those models,
f̂t,ωt(x) =
K∑
k=1
ωk,tf̂k(x|Dt)
A natural question is the optimal choice of the weights ωk,t.
Assume here, as before, a sequential model. We want to predict element
by element a sequence of observations y1, . . . , yT . At each step t, K experts
provide their forecasts ŷ1,t, . . . , ŷK,t for the next outcome yt. The aggregation
weights expert’s prediction ŷk,t according to a rule in order to build its own
forecast ŷt
ŷt =
K∑
k=1
ωk,tŷk,t
The weighting process is online: each instant t, the rule adapts the weights to
the past observations and the accuracy of their respective experts, measured
by the loss function for each expert `(yt, ŷk,t).
Here, the oracle (or target) is the optimal expert aggregation rule. The
prediction ŷ∗ use best possible weight combination by minimizing the loss.
The empirical regret of the aggregation rule f is defined by:
RT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ŷ∗t , yt)− inf
ω∈Ω
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ŷt, yt)
}
where the first term is the estimation error between the target and the pre-
diction, and the second is the approximation error.
There exist several rules for aggregation, the most popular one is probably
the Bernstein Online Aggregator (BOA), described in Algorithm 1, which is
optimal with bounded iid setting for the mean squared loss.
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Algorithm 1: Bernstein Online Aggregator (BOA).
Data: learning rate γ
Result: Sequence ω1, . . . ,ωn
initialization: ω0 ← initial weights (e.g. 1/k);
for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} do
Lj,t ← `(yt, fj(xt|Dt−1))− `(yt, f̂t−1,ωt−1(xt))
pij,t ←
pij,t−1 exp
[− γLj,t(1 + γLj,t)]
exp
[− γ] ;
end
This technique, also called ensemble prediction, based on aggregation of
predictive models, gives an easy way to improve forecasting by using expert
forecasts directly. In the context of energy markets, O’Neill et al. (2010)
shows that a model based on aggregation of simple ones can reduce residential
energy cost and smooths energy usage. Levina et al. (2009) considered the
case where a supplier predicts consumer demand by applying an aggregating
algorithm to a pool of online predictors.
2.3 Bandits
A related problem is the one where an agent have to choose, repeatedly,
among various options but with incomplete information. Multi-armed ban-
dits come from one-armed bandit, understand slot machines, used in casinos.
Imagine an agent playing with several one-armed bandit machines, each one
having a different (unknown) probability of reward associated with. The
game is seen as a sequence of single arm pull action and the goal is to maxi-
mize its cumulative reward. What could be the optimal strategy to get the
highest return?
In order to solve this problem and find the best empirical strategy, the
agent has to explore the environment to figure out which arm gives the best
reward, but at the same time must choose most of the time the empirical
optimal one. It is the exploration-exploitation trade-off: each step either
searching for new actions or exploiting the current best one.
The one-armed bandit problem was used in economics in Rothschild
(1974), when trying to model the strategy of a single firm facing a market
with unknown demand. In an extension, Keller and Rady (1999) consider
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the problem of the monopolistic firm facing an unknown demand that is
subject to random changes over time. Note that the case of several firms ex-
perimenting independently in the same market was addressed in McLennan
(1984). The choice between various research projects often takes the form
of a bandit problem. In Weitzman (1979), each arm represents a distinct
research project with a random reward associated with it. The issue is to
characterize the optimal sequencing over time in which the projects should
be undertaken. It shows that as novel projects provide an option value to the
research, the optimal sequence is not necessarily the sequence of decreasing
expected rewards. More recently, Bergemann and Hege (1998) and Berge-
mann and Hege (2005) model venture, or innovation, as a Poisson bandit
model with variable learning intensity.
Multi-armed bandit problems are a particular case of reinforcement learn-
ing problems. However, in the bandits case the action does not impact the
agent state. Bandits are an subset of model in online learning; and benefits
of theoretical results under strong assumptions, most of the time to strong
for real-world problems. The multi-armed bandit problem, originally de-
scribed by Robbins (1952), is a statistical decision model of an agent trying
to optimize his decisions while improving his information at the same time.
The multi-armed bandit problem and many variations are presented in de-
tail in Gittins (1989) and Berry and Fristedt (1985). An alternative proof of
the main theorem, based on dynamic programming can be found in Whittle
(1983). The basic idea is to find for every arm a retirement value, and then
to choose in every period the arm with the highest retirement value.
In bandits, the information that the learner gets is more restraint than
in general online learning: the learner has only access to the cost (loss or
reward). At each step t, the learner choose ŷt ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Then the loss
vector (`t(1), . . . , `t(K)) is established. Eventually, the learner has access to
`t(ŷt).
Such a problem is called |A|−multi-armed bandit in the literature, where
A is the set of action. The learner has K arms, i.e K probability distributions
(ν1, . . . , νK). Each step t, the agent pulls an arm at ∈ 1, . . . , K and receives
a reward rt following the probability distribution νat . Let µk be the mean
reward of distribution νk. The value of an action at is the expected reward
Q(at) = E[rt|at]: if action at at t is referring to picking the k-th arm of
the slot machine, then Q(at) = µk. The goal is to maximize the cumulative
rewards
∑T
t=1 rt. The bandit algorithm is thus a sequential sampling strategy:
at+1 = ft(at, rt, . . . , a1, r1).
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To measure the bandit algorithm performance, we use the previous de-
fined regret. Maximizing the cumulative reward becomes maximizing the
potential regret, i.e. the loss of not choosing the optimal actions.
We note µ∗ = max
a∈{1,...,K}
{µa} and the optimal policy is
a∗ = argmax
a∈{1,...,K}
{
µa
}
= argmax
a∈{1,...,K}
{
Q(a)
}
.
The regret of a bandit algorithm is thus:
Rν(A, T ) = Tµ∗ − E
[
T∑
t=1
rt
]
= Tµ∗ − E
[
T∑
t=1
Q(at)
]
where the first term is the sum of rewards of the oracle strategy which always
selects a∗, and the second is the cumulative reward of the agent’s strategy.
What could be an optimal strategy ? To get a small regret, a strategy
should not select to much sub-optimality arms, i.e. µ∗ − µa > 0, which re-
quires to try all arms to estimate the values of these gaps. This leads to
the exploration exploitation trade-off previously mentioned. Betting on the
current best arm at = argmax {µat} is called exploitation, while checking
that no other arm are better at 6= argmax {µat} to find a lower gap is called
exploration. This will be called a greedy action, since it might also be inter-
esting to explore by selecting a non-optimal action that might improve our
estimation.
For essentially computational reason (mainly keeping record of all the
rewards on the period), it is preferred to write the value function in an
incremental expression, as described in Sutton and Barto (1998),
Qt+1 =
1
t
t∑
i=1
ri =
1
t
((t− 1)Qt + rt) = Qt + 1
t
(rt −Qt)
This leads to the general update rule:
NewEstimate = OldEstimate + StepSize (Target - OldEstimate),
where Target is a noisy estimate of the true target, and StepSize may depends
on t and a. This value function expression, which also identifies to a gradient
descent, has already be observed in concerning expert aggregation and will
be studied again in the following.
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Recently, Misra et al. (2019) consider the case where sellers must decide,
on real-time, prices for a large number of item, with incomplete demand in-
formation. Using experiments, the seller learns about the demand curve and
the profit-maximizing price. The multi-armed bandit algorithms provides an
automated pricing policy, using a scalable distribution-free algorithm.
2.4 Reinforcement Learning: a short description
In the context of prediction and games (tic-tac-toe, chess, go, or video games),
choosing the ‘best’ move is complicated. Creating datasets used in the previ-
ous approaches (possibly using random simulation) is too costly, since ideally
we would like to get all possible actions (positions on the chess board or hands
of cards). As explained in Goodfellow et al. (2016, page 105), “some machine
learning algorithms do not just experience a fixed dataset. For example, re-
inforcement learning algorithms interact with an environment, so there is a
feedback loop between the learning system and its experiences”.
2.4.1 The concepts
In Reinforcement Learning, as in Multi-armed Bandits, data is available at
sequential order. But the actions depends on the environment, thus an action
at a certain state could give a different reward re-visiting the same state.
More specifically, at time t
- the learner takes an action at ∈ A
- the learner obtains a (short-term) reward rt ∈ R
- then the state of the world becomes st+1 ∈ S
The states S refer to the different situations the agent might be in. In
the maze, the location of the rat is a state of the world. The actions A
refer to the set of options available to the agent at some point in time,
across all states of the world, and therefore, actions might depend on the
state. If the rat is facing a wall, in a dead-end, the only possible action is
usually to turn back, while, at some crossroad, the rat can choose various
actions. The rewards set R refer to how rewards (and possibly punishments)
are distributed. It can be deterministic, or probabilistic, so in many cases,
agents will compute expected values of rewards, conditional on states and
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actions. These notations were settled in Sutton and Barto (1998), where the
goal is to maximize rewards, while previously, Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996)
suggested to minimze costs, with some cost-to-go functions.
As in Bandits, the interaction between the environment and the agent
involves a trajectory (called also episode). The trajectory is characterized by
a sequence of states, actions and rewards. The initial state leads to the first
action which gives a reward; then the model is fed by a new state followed
by another action and so on.
To determine the dynamics of the environment, and thus the interaction
with the agent, the model relies on transition probabilities. It will be based on
past states, and past actions, too. Nevertheless, with the Markov assumption,
we will assume that transition probabilities depend only on the current state
and action, and not the full history.
Let T be a transition function S ×A× S → [0, 1] where:
P
[
st+1 = s
′∣∣st = s, at = a, at−1, at−2, . . . ] = T (s, a, s′).
As a consequence, when selecting an action a, the probability distribution
over the next states is the same as the last time we tried this action in the
same state.
A policy is an action, decided at some state of the world. Formally policies
are mapping from S into A, in the sense that pi(s) ∈ A is an action chosen
in state s ∈ S. Note that stochastic policies can be considered, and in that
case, pi is a S × A → [0, 1] function, such that pi(a, s) is interpreted as the
probability to chose action a ∈ A in state s ∈ S. The set of policies is
denoted Π.
After time step t, the agent receives a reward rt. The goal is to maximize
its cumulative reward in the long run, thus to maximize the expected return.
Resuming Sutton and Barto (1998), we can defined the return as the sum of
the reward:
Gt =
T∑
k=t+1
rk
Unlike in bandits approaches, here the cumulative reward is computed start-
ing from t. Sometimes the agents can receive running reward, associated
to tasks where there is no notion of final time step, so we introduce the
discounted return:
Gt =
∞∑
k=0
γkrt+1+k
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where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the discount factor which gives more importance to recent
reward (and can allow Gt to exist). We can also re-write Gt in a recursive
(or incremental way too) since Gt = rt+1 + γGt+1.
To quantify the performance of an action, we introduce, as in the previous
section, the action-function, or Q-value on S ×A:
Qpi(st, at) = EP
[
Gt
∣∣∣st, at, pi] (1)
In order to maximize the reward, as in bandits, the optimal strategy is
characterized by the optimal policies
pi?(st) = argmax
a∈A
{
Q?(st, a)
}
.
That function can be used to derive an optimal policy, and the optimal value
function producing the best possible return (in sense of regret):
Q?(st, at) = max
pi∈Π
{
Qpi(st, at)
}
.
Considering optimal strategy and regret leads to the previously mentioned
exploration exploitation trade-off. As seen in the bandits section, the learner
try various actions to explore the unknown environment in order to learn
the transition function T and the reward R. The exploration is commonly
implemented by ε-greedy algorithm (described in the bandits section), as in
Monte-Carlo methods or Q-learning.
Bergemann and Vlimki (1996) provided a nice economic application of
the exploration-exploitation dilemma. In this model, the true value of each
seller’s product to the buyer is initially unknown, but additional information
can be gained by experimentation. When assuming that prices are given
exogeneously, the buyer’s problem is a standard multi-armed bandit problem.
The paper in nevertheless original since the cost of experimentation is here
endogenized.
2.4.2 An inventory illustration
A classical application of such framework is the control of inventory, with
limited size, when the demand is uncertain. Action at ∈ A denote the
number of ordered items arriving on the morning of day t. The cost is pat if
the individual price of items is p (but some fixed costs to order items can also
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be considered). Here A = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m} where m is the maximum size of
storage. States st = S are the number of items available at the end of the day
(before ordering new items for the next day). Here also, S = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Then, the state dynamics are
st+1 =
(
min{(st + at),m} − εt
)
+
where εt is the unpredictable demand, independent and identically distributed
variables, taking values in S. Clearly, (st) is a Markov chain, that can be
described by its transition function T ,
T (s, a, s′) = P
[
st+1 = s
′∣∣st = s, at = a] = P[εt = (min{(s+ a),m} − s′)+]
The reward function R is such that, on day t, revenue made is
rt = −pat + pεt = −pat + p
(
min{(st + at),m} − st+1
)
+
= R(st, at, st+1)
where p is the price when items are sold to consumers (and p is the price
when items are purchased). Note that in order to have a more interesting
(and realistic) model, we should introduce fixed costs to order items, as costs
to store item. In that case
rt = −pat + p
(
min{(st + at),m} − st+1
)
+
− k11at>0 − k2st,
for some costs k1 and k2. Thus, reinforcement learning will appear quite
naturally in economic problems, and as we will see in the next section, sev-
eral algorithms can be used to solve such problems, especially when some
quantities are unknown, and can only be estimated... assuming that enough
observations can be collected to do so.
3 Reinforcement Learning
Now that most of essential notions have been defined and explained, we
can focus on Reinforcement Learning principles, and possible extensions.
This section deals with the most common approaches, its links with ordinary
economy or finance problems and, eventually, some know difficulties of those
models.
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3.1 Mathematical context
Classically, a Markov property is assumed on the reward and the obser-
vations. A Markov decision process (MDP) is a collection (S,A, T, r, γ)
where S is a state space, A is an action space, T the transition function
S × A × S → [0, 1], R is a reward function S × A × S → R+ and γ ∈ [0, 1)
is some discount factor. A policy pi ∈ Π is a mapping from S to A.
Algorithm 2: Policy generation
Data: transition function T and policy pi
Result: Sequence (at, st)
initialization: s1 ← initial state;
for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . } do
at ← pi(st) ∈ A ;
st+1 ← T (st, at, ·) = P
[
st+1 = ·
∣∣st, at, ] ∈ S ;
end
Given a policy pi, its expected reward, starting from state s ∈ S, at time
t, is
V pi(st) = EP
(∑
k∈N
γkrt+k
∣∣∣st, pi) (2)
called value of a state s under policy pi, where rt = Ea[R(st, a, st+1)] when
a ∼ pi(st, ·) and P is such that P(St+1 = st+1|st, at) = T (st, a, st+1). Since the
goal in most problem is to find a best policy – that is the policy that receives
the most reward – define
V ?(st) = max
pi∈Π
{
V pi(st)
}
As in Watkins and Dayan (1992), one can define the Q-value on S × A
as
Qpi(st, at) = EP
(∑
k∈N
γkrt+k
∣∣∣st, at, pi)
which can be written, from Bellman’s equation (see Bellman (1957))
Qpi(st, at) =
∑
s′∈S
[
r(st, at, s
′) + γQpi(s′, pi(s′))
]
T (st, at, s
′) (3)
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Algorithm 3: Policy valuation
Data: policy pi, threshold  > 0, reward R(s, a, s′), ∀s, a, s′
Result: Value of policy pi, V pi
initialization: V (s) for all s ∈ S and ∆ = 2;
while ∆ >  do
∆← 0 for s ∈ S do
v ← V (s) ;
V (s)←
∑
a∈A
pi(a, s)
∑
s′∈∫
T (s, a, s′)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γV (s′)
]
;
∆← max{∆, |v − V (s)|}
end
end
and as previously, let
Q?(st, at) = max
pi∈Π
{
Qpi(st, at)
}
.
Observe that Qpi(st, at) identifies to the value function in state st when play-
ing action at at time t and then acting optimally. Hence, knowing the Q-
function directly provides the derivation of an optimal policy
pi?(st) = argmax
a∈A
{
Q?(st, a)
}
.
This optimal policy pi? assigns to each states s the highest-valued action. In
most applications, solving a problem boils down to computing the optimal
policy pi?.
Note that with finite size spaces S and A, we can use a vector form for
Qpi(s, a)’s, Qpi, which is a vector of size |S||A|. In that case, Equation (3)
can be written
Qpi = R+ γPΠQpi (4)
where R is such that
R(s,a) =
∑
s′∈S
r(st, at, s
′)T (st, at, s′)
and PΠ is the matrix of size |S||A| × |S||A| that constraints transition
probabilities, from (s, a) to (s′, pi(s′)) (and therefore depends on policy pi).
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If we use notations introduced in section 2.4, we have to estimate Q(s, a)
for all states s and actions a, or function V (s). Bellman equation on Qpi
means that V pi satisfies
V pi(st) =
∑
s′∈S
[
r(st, pi(st), s
′) + γV pi(s′)
]
T (st, pi(st), s
′). (5)
Algorithm 4: Direct policy search
Data: A threshold , reward R(s, a, s′), ∀s, a, s′
Result: Optimal policy pi?
initialization: V (s) for all s ∈ S and ∆ = 2;
while ∆ >  do
∆← 0 for s ∈ S do
v ← V (s) ;
V (s)← max
a∈A
{∑
s′∈S
T (s, a, s′)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γV (s′)
]}
;
∆← max{∆, |v − V (s)|};
end
end
for s ∈ S do
pi(s)← argmax
a∈A
{∑
s′∈S
T (s, a, s′)
[
R(s) + γV (s′)
]}
;
end
Unfortunately, in many applications, agents have no prior knowledge of
reward function r, or transition function T (but do know that it satisfies the
Markov property). Thus, the agent will have to explore – or perform actions
– that will give some feedback, that can be used, or exploited.
As discussed previously, Q function is updated using
Q(s, a)← (1− α)Q(s, a) + α(r(s, a, s′) + γmax
a′∈A
{
Q(s′, a′)
})
.
A standard procedure for exploration is the -greedy policy, mentioned
already in the bandit context, where the learner makes the best action with
probability 1 − , and consider a randomly selected action with probability
. Alternatively, consider some exploration function that will give preference
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to less-visited states, using some sort of penalty
Q(s, a)← (1− α)Q(s, a) + α
(
r(s, a, s′) + γmax
a′∈A
{
Q(s′, a′) +
κ
ns,a
})
.
where ns,a denotes the number of times where state (s, a) has been visited,
where κ will be related to some exploration rate. Finally, with the Boltzmann
exploration strategy, probabilities are weighted with their relative Q-values,
with
p(a) =
eβQ(s,a)
eβQ(s,a1) + · · ·+ eβQ(s,an) ,
for some β > 0 parameter. With a low value for β, the selection strategy
tends to be purely random. On the other hand, with a high value for beta,
the algorithm selects the action with the highest Q-value, and thus, ceases
the experiment.
3.2 Some Dynamical Programming principles
In Dynamic Programming, as well as in most of Reinforcement Learning
problem, we use value functions to choose actions and build an optimal policy.
Many algorithms of this field compute optimal policies in a fully know model
in a Markov decision process environment. It is not always possible in real-
world problems or too computational expensive. However, Reinforcement
Learning lies on several principles of Dynamic Programming and we present
here a way to obtain an optimal policy once we have found the optimal value
functions which satisfy the Bellman equation: the Policy iteration.
3.2.1 Policy iteration
Value function V pi satifies Equation (5), or to be more specific a system of
|S| linear equations, that can be solved when all functions – T and r – are
known. An alternative is to use an iterative procedure, where Bellman’s
Equation is seen as a updating rule, where V pik+1 is an updated version of V
pi
k
V pik+1(st) =
∑
s′∈S
[
r(st, pi(st), s
′) + γV pik (s
′)
]
T (st, pi(st), s
′). (6)
The value function V pi is a fixed point of this recursive equation.
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Once we can evaluate a policy pi, Howard (1960) suggested a simple iter-
ative procedure to find the optimal policy, called policy iteration. The value
of all action a is obtained using
Qpi(st, a) =
∑
s′∈S
[
r(st, a, s
′) + γV pi(s′)
]
T (st, a, s
′),
so if Qpi(st, a) is larger than V
pi(st) for some a ∈ A, choosing a instead of
pi(st) would have a higher value. It is then possible to improve the policy
by selecting that better action. Hence, a greedy policy pi′ can be considered,
simply by choosing the best action,
pi′(st) = argmax
a∈A
{Qpi(st, a)}.
The algorithm suggested by Howard (1960) starts from a policy pi0, and then,
at step k, given a policy pik, compute its value V
pik then improve it with pik+1,
and iterate.
Unfortunately, such a procedure can be very long, as discussed in Bert-
sekas and Tsitsiklis (1996). And it assumes that all information is available,
which is not the case in many applications. As we will see in the next sec-
tions, it is then necessary to sample to learn the model – the transition rate
and the reward function.
3.2.2 Policy Iteration using least squares
Qpi(s, a) is essentially an unknown function, since it is the expected value
of the cumulated sum of discounted future random rewards. As discussed
in Section 2.2, a natural stategy is to use a parametric model, Qpi(s, a,β)
that will approximate Qpi(s, a). Linear predictors are obtained using a linear
combination of some basis functions,
Qpi(s, a,β) =
k∑
j=1
ψj(s, a)βj = ψ(s, a)
>βj,
for some simple functions ψj, such as polynomial transformations. With the
notation of section 2.4.1, write Qpi = Ψβ. Thus, substituting in equation
(4), we obtain
Ψβ ≈ R+ γPΠΨβ or (Φ− γPΠΨ)β ≈ R.
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As in section 2.4.1, we have an over-constrained system of linear equations,
and the least-square solution is
β? =
(
(Ψ− γPΠΨ)>(Ψ− γPΠΨ))−1(Ψ− γPΠΨ)>R.
This is also called Bellman residual minimizing approximation. And as
proved in Nedic´ and Bertsekas (2003) and Lagoudakis and Parr (2003), for
any policy pi, the later can be written
β? =
(
Ψ>(Ψ− γPΠΨ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
)−1
Ψ>R︸ ︷︷ ︸
=b
.
Unfortunately, when rewards and transition probability are not given, we
cannot use (directly) the equations obtained above. But some approximation,
based on previous t observed values can be used. More precisely, at time t
we have a sample Dt = (si, ai, ri), and we can use algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: Least square policy iteration
Data: Policy pi, γ, sample Dt and basis functions ψj
Result: Optimal pi
initialization Â← 0 and B̂ ← 0;
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t− 1} do
Â← Â+ ψ(si, ai)
(
ψ(si, ai)− γψ(si+1, pi(si+1))
)>
;
b̂← b̂+ ψ(si, ai)ri ;
end
β̂? ← Â
−1
b̂ ;
pi?(s)← argmax
a∈A
{
ψ(s, a)>β̂?
}
If states and actions are uniformely observed on those t past values, Â
and b̂ converge respectively towards A and b and therefore, β̂? = Â
−1
b̂ is a
consistent approximation of β?.
3.2.3 Model-Based vs Model-Free Learning
Model-based strategies are based on a fully known environment. We can
learn about the state transition T (st, at, st+1) = P(St+1 = st+1|st, at) and the
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reward function R(st) and find the optimal solution using dynamic program-
ming. Starting from s0, the agent will chose randomly selection actions in
A at each step. Let (si, ai, si+1) denote the simulated set of present state,
present action and future state. After n generations, the empirical transition
is
T̂n(s, a, s
′) =
∑
i 1(s,a,s′)(si, ai, si+1)∑
i 1(s,a)(si, ai)
and
R̂n(s, a, s
′) =
∑
iR(si, ai, si+1)∑
i 1(s,a,s′)(si, ai, si+1)
By the law of large numbers, T̂n and R̂n will respectively converge towards
T and R, as n goes to infinity. This is the exploration part.
That strategy is opposed to so-called model-free approaches.
In the next sections, we will describe classical model-free algorithms:
Temporal-Difference (TD), Policy Gradient and Actor-Critic. For the first
one, we will focus on one significant breakthroughs in reinforcement learn-
ing, the Q-learning (introduced in Watkins (1989)), an off-policy TD control
model. As TD approach, it will necessitate to interact with the environment,
meaning that it will be necessary to simulate the policy, and to generate
samples, as in the generalized policy iteration (GPI) principle, introduced
in Sutton and Barto (1998). Recent works using neural network, like Deep
Q-Network (DQN) show impressive results in complex environment.
3.3 Some Solution Methods
Here is presented briefly some common methods to solve Reinforcement
Learning problems.
3.3.1 Q-learning
Q-learning was introduced in Watkins and Dayan (1992). Bellman Equation
(3) was
Qpi(st, at) =
∑
s′∈S
[
R(st, at, s
′) + γQpi(s′, pi(s′))
]
T (st, at, s
′),
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and the optimal value was satisfies
Q?(st, at) =
∑
s′∈S
[
R(st, at, s
′)+γV ?(s′)
]
T (st, at, s
′) where V ?(s′) = max
a′∈A
{
Q?(s′, a′)
}
.
Thus, Q-learning is based on the following algorithm: starting from Q0(s, a),
at step k + 1 set
Qk+1(s, a) =
∑
s′∈S
[
R(s, a, s′) + γmax
a′∈A
{
Qk(s
′, a′)
}]
T (s, a, s′).
This approach is used in Hasselt (2010) where the Q-function, i.e. value-
function, is approximated by a neural network.
3.3.2 Policy Optimization
In order to avoid computing and comparing the expected return of differ-
ent actions, as in Q-learning, an agent could learn directly a mapping from
states to actions. Here, we try to infer a parameterized policy pi(a|s, θ) that
maximizes the outcomes reward from an action on an environment. Pol-
icy learning converges faster than Value-based learning process and allows
continuous action space of the agent as the policy is now a parameterized
function depending on θ. An infinite number of actions would be compu-
tationally too expensive to optimize. This approach is based the on Policy
Gradient Theorem from Sutton and Barto (1998).
3.3.3 Approximate Solution Methods: Actor-Critic
Actor-Critics aim to take advantage of both Value and Policy approaches .
By merging them, it can benefit of continuous and stochastic environments
and faster convergence of Policy learning, and sample efficiency and steady
of Value one. In the Actor-Critic approach, two model interact in order
to gives the best cumulative reward. Using simultaneously an actor, which
updates the policy parameter, and a critic which updates the value function
or action-value function, this model is able to learn complex environments
as well as complex Value-functions.
3.4 Inverse Reinforcement Learning
In the econometric literature, this problem can be found in many articles
published in the 80’s, such as Miller (1984) in the context of job match-
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ing and occupational choice, Pakes and Schankerman (1984) on the rate of
obsolescence of patents, and research gestation lags, Wolpin (1984) on the es-
timation of a dynamic stochastic model of fertility and child mortality, Pakes
(1986) on optimal investment strategies or Rust (1987) on replacement of bus
engines, where structural models are used to better understand human de-
cision making. Hotz and Miller (1993), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) or
more recently Magnac and Thesmar (2002) or Su and Judd (2012) mentioned
the computational complexity of such algorithms on economic applications.
Most of those approaches are related to the literature on dynamic discrete
choice model (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) for a survey, or Semenova
(2018) for connections with machine learning tools). In those models, there is
a finite set of possible actions A, as assumed also in the previous descriptions,
and they focus on conditional choice probability, which is the probability that
choosing a ∈ A is optimal in state s ∈ S,
ccp(a|s) = P[a is optimal in state s] = P[{Q(a, s) ≥ Q(a′, s), ∀a′ ∈ A}].
Assuming that rewards have a Gumbel distribution, we obtain a multinomial
logit model, where the log-odds ratios are proportional to the value function.
For instance in the bus-repair problem of Rust (1987), the state s is the
mileage of the bus, and the action a is in the set {opr, rep} (either operate,
or replace). Per period, the utility is
Uθ(st, εt, a) = εt + uθ = εt +
{ −OCθ(st) if a = opr
−RC −OCθ(0) if a = rep
where RC is some (fixed) replacing cost, OCθ is the operating cost (that
might depend on some parameter θ), and εt is supposed to have a Gumbel
distribution. The respective costs are supposed to be known
Then
ccpθ(a|s) =
exp[vθ(s, a)]
exp[vθ(s, opr)] + exp[vθ(s, rep)]
where vθ(s, a) = uθ(s, a) + βEVθ(s, a) where ESθ(s, a) is the unique solution
of
EVθ(s, a) =
∫
log
[
uθ(s, opr)+uθ(s
′, opr)+β(EVθ(s, opr)+EVθ(s′, rep))
]
T (s′|s, a)
Hotz and Miller (1993) proved that the mapping between conditional choice
probabilities and choice specific value function is invertible. As discussed in
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Su and Judd (2012), based on observed decisions made by the superintendent
of maintenance of the bus company, structural estimation is computationally
complex.
The main idea of inverse reinforcement learning (or learning from demon-
stration, as defined in Schaal (1996)) is to learn the reward function based on
the agent’s decisions, and then find the optimal policy (the one that maxi-
mizes this reward function) using reinforcement learning techniques. Similar
techniques are related to this idea. In imitation learning (also called be-
havioral cloning in Bain and Sammut (1995)), we learn the policy using su-
pervised learning algorithms, based on the sample of observations {(si, ai)},
that is unfortunately not distributed independently and identically in the
state-action space. In apprenticeship learning, we try to find a policy that
perform as well as the expert policy, as introduced in Abbeel and Ng (2004).
Rothkopf and Dimitrakakis (2011) mentioned applications of reinforcement
learning on preference elicitation, extended in Klein et al. (2012). See Ng
et al. (2000) for a survey of various algorithms used in inverse reinforcement
learning, as well as Abbeel and Ng (2004).
4 Applications
4.1 Applications in Economic Modeling
If it is possible to find a framework very similar to the one use in reinforcement
learning in old economic literature (see for instance the seminal thesis Hellwig
(1973)), as mentioned in Arthur (1991) or Barto and Singh (1991), two survey
of reinforcement learning techniques in computational economics, published
thirty years ago. Recently, Hughes (2014) updated the survey on applications
of reinforcement learning to economic problems with up-to-date algorithms.
4.1.1 Consumption and Income Dynamics
Consider an infinitely living agent, with utility u(ct) when consuming ct ≥ 0
in period t. That agent receives random income yt at time t, and assume that
(yt) is a Markov process with transition T (s, s
′) = P[yt+1 = s′|yt = s]. Let wt
denote the wealth of the agent, at time t, so that wt+1 = wt+yt−ct. Assume
that the wealth must be non-negative, so ct ≤ wt + yt. And for convenience,
w0 = 0, as in Lettau and Uhlig (1999). At time t, given state st = (wt, yt),
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we seek c?t solution of
v(wt, yt) = max
c∈[0,wt+yt]
{
u(c) + γ
∑
y′
[
v(wt + yt − c, y′)
]
T (yt, y
′)
}
This is a standard recursive model, discussed in Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2018) or Hansen and Sargent (2013), assuming that utility function u is
continuous, concave, strictly increasing and bounded, the value function v
is itself continuous, concave, strictly increasing and bounded in wealth wt,
and gives a unique decision function c?(wt, yt). Stokey et al. (1989) extented
that model to derive a general dynamic decision problem where income y
is now a state s ∈ S = {s1, . . . , sn}, and consumption c is now an action
a ∈ A = {a1, . . . , am}. Utility is now a function of (s, a), and it is assume
that the state process (st) is a Markov chain, with transition matrix T a
(and transition function Ta). The decision problem is written as a dynamic
problem
v(s) = max
a∈A
{
u(s, a) + γEs′∼Ta
[
v(s′)
]}
Using contraction mapping theorems, there is a unique solution v? to this
problem, that can be characterized by some decision function pi? : S 7→ A
that prescribes the best action pi?(s) in each state s.
vpi(s) = u(s, pi(s)) + γEs′∼Ta
[
vpi(s′)
]
The solution can be obtained easily using some matrix formulation, vpi =
(In − γT pi)−1upi, where vpi = (vpi(si)) ∈ Rn, T pi = [T pi(si)(sj)] is a n × n
matrix, and upi = (si, pi(si)) ∈ Rn. Once vpi is obtained for any policy pi,
then v? is the maximum value. Stokey et al. (1989) gives several rules of
thumb to solve that problem more efficiently, inspired by Holland (1986).
In the context of multiple agents, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) describes
an economy with three indivisible goods, that could be stored, but with a
cost, and three types of agents, infinitely living, favoring one of the good. In
Basci (1999), agents do not know the equilibrium strategies and act according
to some randomly held beliefs regarding the values of the possible actions.
Agents have opportunities of both learning by experience, and by imitation.
Basci (1999) observes that the presence of imitation either speeds up social
convergence to the theoretical Markov-Nash equilibrium or leads every agent
of the same type to the same mode of suboptimal behavior. We will discuss
Nash equilibrium with multiple agents in the next section.
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4.1.2 Bounded Rationality
Simon (1972) discussed the limits of the rationality concept, central in most
economic models, introducing the notion of bounded rationality, related to
various concepts that were studied afterwards, such as bounded optimality
(as in Russell and Subramanian (1995) with possible limited thinking time,
or memory constraints) or computational rationality (as defined in Gershman
et al. (2015)) minimal rationality (such as Cherniak (1986) where minimal
sets of conditions to have rationality are studied), ecological or environmen-
tal rationality (with a close look at the environment, that will influence de-
cisions, as discussed in Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996)). More recently,
Kahneman (2011) popularized this concept with the two modes of thought:
system 1 is fast, instinctive and emotional while System 2 is slower, more
deliberative, and more logical. Simon (1972) suggests that bounded ratio-
nality can be related to uncertainty, incomplete information, and possible
deviations from the original goal, emphasizing the importance of heuristics
to solve complex problems, also called practical rationality (see Rubinstein
(1998) of Aumann (1997) for some detailed survey). Recently, Leimar and
McNamara (2019) suggested that adaptive and reinforcement learning leads
to bounded rationality, while Abel (2019) motivates reinforcement learning
as a suitable formalism for studying boundedly rational agents, since “at a
high level, Reinforcement Learning unifies learning and decision making into
a single, general framework”.
Simon (1972) introduce dthe problem of infinite regress, where agents are
spending more resources on finding the optimal simplification of the problem
than solving the original problem. This simplification problem is related to
the sparsity issue in standard supervised learning. Gabaix (2014) discussed
algorithms for finding a sparse model, either with short range memory, or
focusing on local thinking, as defined in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) (where
agents combine data received from the external world with information re-
trieved from memory to evaluate a hypothesis). Reinforcement learning pro-
vides powerful tools to solve complex problems, where agents are suppose
to have bounded rationality. And the literature (in reinforcement learning)
has developed sereval measures for evaluating the capacity of an agent to
effectively explore its environment. The first one is the regret of an agent,
which measures how much worse the agent is relative to the optimal strategy
(that could be related to unbounded rationality). The second one is the sam-
ple complexity (or computational complexity) which measures the number of
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samples an agent need before it can act near-optimally, with high probability.
4.1.3 Single firm dynamics
Jovanovic (1982) gave the framework for most models dealing with industry
dynamics with Bayesian learning. In a model of competition between firms
with multiple equilibrium, firms are engaged in an adaptive process, where
they learn how to play an equilibrium of the game, as in Fudenberg and
Levine (1998). In those models, firms know the model that describes the
environment, but there are uncertainties. So agents will learn over time about
these elements, when new information arrives. Note that this approach is
different from the one in evolutionary game theory (as in Samuelson (1997))
for instance, where agents might not even know that they play a game.
Consider a monopolistic firm, taking actions at ∈ A – say investment
decisions – in order to maximize its expected discounted inter-temporal profit.
States of the world are st ∈ S, and we assume that they can be modeled via
a Markov process. If future investments are uncertain, it can be assumed
that the first will use the same optimal decision rule that the one it uses at
time t, taking into account available information. Let rt denote the profit
obtained at time t.
In economic literature, rational expectations were usually considered in
early models, meaning that the expectation is computed under the true
transition probability. Nevertheless, Cyert and DeGroot (1974) or Feldman
(1987) suggested that the first should learn this transition probability pi, and
a Bayesian framework was considered. Starting from a prior belief, transi-
tion probabilities T are supposed to belong to some space T , and experience
is used to update mixing probabilities on T . Sargent (1993) considered a
weaker updating rule, simpler (related to linear approximations in Bayesian
models) but not optimal, usually called adaptative learning. In that case,
belief at time t, Tt(s, a, s
′) is a weighted sum of Tt−1(s, a, s′) and some dis-
tance between T (s, a, s′) and (st−1, at−1, st) (through some kernel function).
If the weight related to the new observation is of order 1/t, recursive least
squares learning is obtained; if weights are constant, adaptative learning is
here faster than standard Bayesian learning, which is usually seen as a good
property when there are shocks in the economy.
Erev and Roth (1998) explicitly introduced the idea of stock of reinforce-
ment, corresponding to the standard Q-function. and for any action-state
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pair (a, s), the updating rule is
Qt+1(a, s)← Qt(a, s) + γtk
(
(a, s)− (at, st)
)
where some kernel k is considered. Recently, Ito and Reguant (2016) used
reinforcement learning to describe sequential energy markets.
4.1.4 Adaptative design for experiments
Most experiments are designed to inform about the impact of choosing a
policy, among various that can be considered. And more precisely, as dis-
cussed in Kasy and Sautmann (2019), the question which program will have
the largest effect is usually preferred to the question does this program have
a significant effect, in many cases, see Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and
more recently Athey and Imbens (2016), and references therein. If dynamic
experiments are considered, there are usually several waves, and the op-
timal experimental design would usually learn from earlier waves, and as-
sign more experimental agents to the better-performing treatments in future
waves. Thus, this policy choice problem is a finite-horizon dynamic stochas-
tic optimization problem. Thompson (1933) introduced this idea of adaptive
treatment assignment, and Weber (1992) proved that this problem can be
expressed using multi-armed bandits, and the optimal solution to this bandit
problem is to choose the arm with the to the highest Gittins index, that can
be related to the so-called Thompson sampling strategy. Thompson sampling
simply assigns the next wave of agents to each treatment with frequencies
proportional to the probability that that each treatment is the optimal one.
As explained in Kasy and Sautmann (2019), standard experimental de-
signs are geared toward point estimation and hypothesis testing. But they
consider the problem of treatment assignment in an experiment with several
non-overlapping waves, where the goal is to choose among a set of possi-
ble policies (here treatments). The optimal experimental design learns from
earlier waves, and assigns more experimental units to the better-performing
treatments in later waves : assignment probabilities are an increasing con-
cave function of the posterior probabilities that each treatment is optimal.
They provide theoretical results to this exploration sampling design.
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4.2 Applications in Operations Research and Game
Theory
Probably more interesting is the case where there are multiple strategic
agents, interacting (see Zhang et al. (2019) for a nice survey). But before, let
us mention the use of reinforcement learning techniques in operation research,
and graphs.
4.2.1 Traveling Salesman
A graph (E, V ) is a collection of edgesE (possibly oriented, possibly weighted)
and vertices (or nodes) V . There are many several classical optimization
problems on graphs. In the traveling salesman problem, we want to find
a subgraph (E?, V ) (with E? ⊂ E) which forms a cycle of minimum total
weight that visits each node V at least once. But one might also think of
max-flow or max-cut problems, or optimal matching on bipartite graphs (see
Galichon (2017) for more examples, with economic applications). In several
problems, we seek an optimal solution, which can be a subset V ? or E?, of
vertices or edges. In the traveling salesman problem (TSP), given an order
list of nodes V ′ that defines a cycle (E? ⊂ E is the subset of edges {(V ′i , V ′i+1)}
with V ⊂ V and V ′i , V ′i+1 ∈ E for all i), the associated loss function is
`(V ′) =
∑
i∈|V ′|
(
w(V ′i , V
′
i+1)
)
, with V ′|V ′|+1 = V1.
Most TSP algorithms are sequential, which will make reinforcement learning
perfectly appropriate here. For instance, the 2-opt algorithm (developed in
Flood (1956) and Croes (1958)) suggests to iteratively remove two edges and
replace these with two different edges that reconnect the fragments created
by edge removal into a shorter tour (or that increases the tour least),
(i?, j?) = argmin
i,j=1,...,|V ′|
{
`(V ′)− `(V˜ (ij))
}
, where V˜
(ij)
k =

V ′j if k = i
V ′i if k = j
V ′k otherwise
Other popular techniques are for instance Christophides algorithm (devel-
oped in Christofides (1976)) or some evolutionary model inspired by ant
colonies (as developed in Dorigo and Gambardella (1996)). Here also, it can
be interesting to explore possibly non-optimal moves on a short term ba-
sis (in the sense that locally they end-up in a longer route) Such sequential
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techniques can be formulated using the framework of reinforcement learn-
ing. The states S are subsets of edges E in the context of TSP that form
a cycle. In the 2-opt algorithm, actions A are nodes that will be permuted.
Rewards are related to changes in the loss function (and the non-discounted
sum of rewards is considered here). The nearest neighbour algorithm (which
is a greedy algorithm) or cheapest insertion (as defined in Rosenkrantz et al.
(1974)) can also be seen with a reinforcement learning algorithm. States
S are subsets of edges E that form partial cycles, and the action A means
growing the route with one node, by inserting it optimally. The rewards is
related to the change in the tour length. That idea was developed in Gam-
bardella and Dorigo (1995) recently, or Dai et al. (2017) for a recent survey of
reinforcement learning techniques in the context of optimization over graphs.
Deudon et al. (2018) provides insights on how efficient machine learning
algorithms could be adapted to solve combinatorial optimization problems
in conjunction with existing heuristic procedures. In Bello et al. (2016) the
heuristic procedure is replaced by some neural networks. Despite the com-
putational expense, an efficient algorithm is obtained.
4.2.2 Stochastic Games and Equilibrium
Consider n players, each of them taking actions ai ∈ Ai and receives a reward
ri. Let a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A and r = (r1, . . . , rn). Note that ri is defined
on S × A. When S is a singleton (and there is no uncertainty), it is a
simple repeated game (or matrix game). A policy pii maps S into Ai. Let
pi = (pi1, . . . , pin), and pi−i the collection of all component policies. Thus,
pi = (pii,pi−i) means that player i uses policy pii while competitors follow
pi−i.
Maskin and Tirole (1988a) introduced the concept of Markov perfect equi-
librium, which is a set of Markovian policies pi = which simultaneously forms
a Nash equilibrium, as discussed in details in Horst (2005) or Escobar (2013).
The existence results of such equilibrium are usually performed in two step:
first, we should prove that given any policies chosen by opponents, pi−i, there
is a unique solution V ?i (s); and then we prove that the static game has a Nash
equilibrium for any state s. For the first step, the set of best response for
player i is Πi(pi−i) such that pi?i ∈ Πi(pi−i) if and only if for any pii and s ∈ S,
V
(pi?i ,pi−i)
i (s) ≥ V (pii,pi−i)i (s). And a Nash equilibrium is a collection of policies
pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) such that for each player i, pii ∈ Πi(pi−i). And therefore, no
player can do better when changing policies, when other players continue to
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use their own strategies.
Littman (1994) usedQ-learning algorithms for zero-sum stochastic games,
with two players. More precisely,
V1(s) = max
pi
{
min
a2∈A2
{∑
a1∈A1
pi(s, a1)Q1(s,a)
}}
= −V2(s).
Erev and Roth (1998) proved that in many games, a one-parameter rein-
forcement learning model robustly outperforms the equilibrium predictions.
Predictive power is improved by adding a forgetting property and valuing
experimentation, with strong connections with rationality concepts. In the
context of games, Franke (2003) applies the approach of reinforcement learn-
ing to Arthur (1994)’s El Farol problem, where repeatedly a population of
agents decides to go to a bar or stay home, and going is enjoyable if, and
only if, the bar is not crowded.
The main difficulty arising when several agents are learning simultane-
ously in a game is that, for each player, the strategy of all the other players
becomes part of the environment. Hence the environment dynamics do not
remain stationary as the other players are learning as they play. In such
context, classical single agent based reinforcement learning algorithms may
not converge to a targeted Nash equilibrium, and typically cycles in between
several of them, see Hart and Mas-Colell (2003). As observed by Erev and
Roth (1998) or in a more general setting by Perolat et al. (2018), stabilizing
procedures such as fictitious play (Robinson (1951)) allows to reach Nash
equilibria in some (but not all, Shapley (1964)) multi Agent learning setting.
Elie et al. (2020) observed that such property also extends to the asymptotic
mean field game setting introduced by Huang et al. (2006) and Lasry and
Lions (2006a,b), where the size of the population is infinite and shares mean
field interaction. Multi-Agent reinforcement learning algorithms still lack
scalability when the number of agents becomes large, a weakness that mean
field games asymptotic properties may hopefully allow to partially overcome.
4.2.3 Auctions and real-time bidding
The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding. To
place an ad automatically, and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to have
a learning algorithm that cleverly bids. Schwind (2007) did show that seeing
the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state
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space is represented by the auction information and the campaign’s real-time
parameters, while an action is the bid price to set, was very promising. More
recently, Even Dar et al. (2009), Zhang et al. (2014), Cai et al. (2017) or
Zhao et al. (2018) use reinforcement learning algorithms to design a bidding
strategy.
As pointed out by recent articles, the scalability problem from the large
real-world auction volume, and campaign budget, is well handled by state
value approximation using neural networks. Dtting et al. (2017) and Feng
et al. (2018) suggested to use deep reinforcement learning (with deep neu-
ral networks) for the automated design of optimal auctions. Even if the
optimal mechanism is unknown, they obtain very efficient algorithm, that
outperforms more classical ones.
4.2.4 Oligopoly and dynamic games
As in the monopolistic case, the profit of firm i will depend on its investing
strategies ai,t, the capital of firm i as well as competitors. Models of oligopoly
with investment and firm entry and exit have been studied in Ericson and
Pakes (1995). And in that framework, multiple equilibira are commonly ob-
served, as proved in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010). The concept of
experience-based equilibrium was introduced in Fershtman and Pakes (2012),
with possibly asymmetric information. Hence, firms use past payoffs to re-
inforce the probability of choosing an action. In that framework, agents
explicitly construct beliefs, which is no longer necessary with reinforcement
learning.
With adaptative learning, Marcet and Sargent (1989a,b) proved that
there was convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium. The reinforce-
ment learning model is here similar to the previous one, there are no as-
sumption about belief of opponents’ strategies. Somehow, those algorithms
are more related to evolutionary games. Brown (1951) suggested that firms
could form beliefs about competitors’ choice probabilities, using some ficti-
tious plays, also called Cournot learnning (studied more deeply in Hopkins
(2002)). Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) added assumptions on firms
beliefs, called rationalizability, under which we can end-up with Nash equi-
libria.
Maskin and Tirole (1988a,b) considered the case where two firms compete
in a Stackelberg competition: they alternate in moving, and then commit to
a price for two periods, before (possibly) adjusting. They did observe cycles
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and tacit collusion within the two firms. Such a result was confirmed by
Kimbrough and Murphy (2008) and Waltman and Kaymak (2008). The later
studied repeated Cournot games where all players act simultaneously. They
study the use of Q-learning for modeling the learning behavior of firms in
that repeated Cournot oligopoly games, and they show that Q-learning firms
generally learn to collude with each other, although full collusion usually does
not emerge. Such a behavior was also observed in Schwalbe (2019) where
self-learning price-setting algorithms can coordinate their pricing behavior
to achieve a collusive outcome that maximizes the joint profits of the firms
using them.
4.3 Applications in Finance
The dynamic control or hedge of risks on financial markets is a natural play-
ground for the use of reinforcement learning algorithms. In the literature,
dynamic risk management problems have been extensively studied in model-
driven settings, using the tools from dynamic programming either in contin-
uous or discrete time. In such framework, reinforcement learning algorithms
naturally opens the door to innovative model-free numerical approximation
schemes for hedging strategies, as soon as a realistic financial market simula-
tor is available. Such simulator may typically incorporate market imperfec-
tions and frictions (transaction costs, market impact, liquidity issues...). In
the following sections, we detail more specifically recent applications on three
topics of interest in such context: pricing and hedging of financial derivatives,
optimal asset allocation and market impact modeling.
4.3.1 Risk management
The valuation and hedging of financial derivatives are usually tackled in the
quantitative finance literature using model-driven decision rules in a stochas-
tic environment. Namely, for given model dynamics of the assets on a fi-
nancial market, pricing and hedging of a derivative boils down to solving a
dynamic optimal control problem for a well chosen arbitrage free martingale
measure. The practical hedging strategy then makes use of the so-called
Greeks, the sensitivities of the risk valuation to the different parameters of
the model.
Such analysis usually lacks efficient numerical approximation methods in
high dimensional settings, as well as precise tractable analytical solutions
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in the presence of realistic market frictions or imperfections. In the spirit
of Weinan et al. (2017) , Buehler et al. (2019) introduced the idea of us-
ing reinforcement learning based algorithm in such context, see also Fcamp
et al. (2019). Let consider given a realistic simulator of the financial market
possible trajectories. We can encompass the price and/or hedging strategy
of the financial derivative in a neural deep network (or any other approxi-
mating class of function), and train/estimate the approximating function in
a dynamic way. At each iteration, we measure the empirical performance
(i.e. loss) of the hedging strategy obtained on a large number of Monte
Carlo simulations, and update its parameters dynamically using any typical
reinforcement learning algorithm. In particular, such approach allows to en-
compass scalable high dimensional risk dynamics as well as realistic market
frictions or hedging using a large number of financial derivatives.
The design of the market simulator of course requires model-driven as-
sumptions, such as the choice of a particular class of volatility models, as
well as its calibration. Nevertheless, we can mention recent attempts on the
design of model free financial market simulator based on generative methods,
such as the one developed e.g. in Wiese et al. (2019a,b).
4.3.2 Portfolio allocation
In a similar manner, the design of dynamic optimal investment strategy nat-
urally falls into the scope of reinforcement learning type algorithms. Such
observation goes back to Moody and Saffell (2001) and has developed a grow-
ing interest in the recent literature Deng et al. (2016); Almahdi and Yang
(2017): Classical Mean-variance trade-off in a continuous time setting is for
example revisited in Wang and Zhou (2019) using such viewpoint. Being
given a financial market simulator together with choices of return and risk
measurement methods written in terms of running or terminal rewards, one
can learn optimal investment strategies using typical reinforcement learning
algorithms.
One could argue that such algorithms for portfolio allocation may often
be reduced to less sophisticate online or bandit type learning algorithms Li
and Hoi (2014). Such argumentation does not remain valid in the more
realistic cases where the investor has a significant impact on the financial
assets dynamics, as discussed in the next section.
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4.3.3 Market microstructure
When trades occur at a very high frequency or concern a large volume of
shares, buying and selling orders have an impact on the financial market
evolution, that one can not neglect. It modifies the shape of the order book,
containing the list of waiting orders chosen by the other traders of the market.
Being given a realistic order book dynamics simulator (or using the financial
market as such), one can optimize using Reinforcement Learning algorithms
the dynamic use of market and limit orders, see Spooner et al. (2018); Gue´ant
and Manziuk (2020); Baldacci et al. (2019). The environment is given by the
current order book shapes while the state typically represents the inventory
of the trader, on a possibly high-dimensional financial market.
Such framework is with no doubt a perfect fit for reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms. Nevertheless, a finer modeling perspective should take into
account that the order book dynamics result from the aggregation of other
traders actions, i.e. buy or sell orders. Hence, as observed e.g. in Ganesh
et al. (2019); Vyetrenko and Xu (2019), such setting is more precisely de-
scribed as a multi-agent learning problem, as the one described above in
Section 4.2.2.
The practical use of reinforcement based learning algorithms on financial
markets suffers two main drawbacks. The first one is the difficulty to create
a realistic financial market simulator, together with the necessity to create a
robust optimal trading strategy, in response to the differences between the
real market and the virtual one. The second and main one is the lack of
stationarity of the financial dynamics, which hereby do not allow to apply
efficiently on future market dynamics, the investment strategies learned on
the past market data points. Besides, the aggregate use of model-free ap-
proaches combined with hardly interpretable black box output policy shall
inevitably lead to hardly controllable financial market dynamics.
5 Conclusion
Deep Reinforcement learning is nowadays the most popular technique for
(artificial) agent to learn closely optimal strategy by experience. Majors
companies are training self driving cars using reinforcement learning (see
Folkers et al. (2019), or Kiran et al. (2020) for a state-of-the-art). Such tech-
niques are extremely powerful to models behaviors of animals, consumers,
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investors, etc. Economists have laid the groundwork for this literature, but
computational difficulties slowed them down. Recent advances in computa-
tional science are extremely promising, and complex economic or financial
problems would benefit from being reviewed in the light of these new results.
Nevertheless, algorithms perform well assuming that a lot of information
is available. More importantly, as the exploration may represent a very large
number of possibilities, the use of deep reinforcement learning algorithms
rapidly requires very important computer power. In finance, despite the lack
of stationary of the market, it is worth noting that these algorithms begin to
be quite popular.
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